Secure communication using coherent states by Barbosa, Geraldo A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
02
10
08
9v
2 
 2
8 
Ju
l 2
00
3
Secure communication using coherent states
Geraldo A. Barbosa, Eric Corndorf, Prem Kumar, and Horace P. Yuen
Center for Photonic Communication and Computing,
ECE Department, Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL 60208-3118
E-mail: barbosa@ece.northwestern.edu
G. Mauro D’Ariano, Matteo G. A. Paris, and Paolo Perinotti
Quantum Optics & Information Group,
INFM, Universita` di Pavia,
via Bassi 6, I-27100 Pavia, Italy
We demonstrate that secure communication using coherent states is possible. The optimal eaves-
dropping strategy for an M -ry ciphering scheme shows that the minimum probability of error in a
measurement for bit determination can be made arbitrarily close to the pure guessing value Pe = 1/2.
This ciphering scheme can be optically amplified without degrading the security level. New avenues
are open to secure communications at high speeds in fiber-optic or free-space channels.
Secure communication protocols protected by physical
laws instead of mathematical complexities, such as the
BB84 quantum protocol for key distribution,[1] seem to
have encountered a bottle-neck that hampers their uti-
lization in real networks. The same no-cloning theorem
that guarantees security forbids signal amplification nec-
essary in long-haul communication links. No alternate
quantum scheme using quantum repeaters or entangled
states, having practical applicability within a reason-
able time span, has been envisaged. The question “is
it possible to create a system with available technology
that could provide unconditional security in long distance
communication?” has a positive answer. It relies on the
use of quantum noise inherent in the coherent states of
light, as demonstrated in this paper.
In the presence of noise, it has been shown informa-
tion theoretically[2] that new shared secret keys can be
created between two users. A specific protocol has been
proposed by Yuen,[3, 4] which has been called the YK
protocol. A particular implementation of this YK proto-
col has been demonstrated,[5] in which detector noise is
utilized and hence it is not unconditionally secure. How-
ever, the YK protocol can be made unconditionally se-
cure by utilizing the fundamental, unavoidable quantum
noise in a quantum signaling scheme.[6] The other known
secure scheme is, of course, the BB84,[1] or its variant
that involves features of B92,[7] where coherent states
instead of Fock states are employed. The implementa-
tions of the YK protocol,[5] and BB84, both suffer from
the intrinsic limitation that very weak signals with no
more than one photon per mode have to be used, mak-
ing them severely rate-limited in a lossy channel. This
problem can be alleviated in a new protocol, where meso-
scopic coherent states are employed to overcome loss and
to allow ordinary amplification, switching and routing.
In addition to the use of the fundamentally-unavoidable
quantum noise in coherent states, a crucial new ingredi-
ent in this protocol is the explicit use of a shared secret
key for the cryptographic objective of key expansion. A
shared secret key is also needed in the BB84 and the YK
protocols for the purpose of user and message authenti-
cation amidst the protocol execution.
In the ciphering scheme for this new protocol the
sender (Alice) uses an explicit secret key (a short key
K, appropriately expanded into a longer key K′ by use
of another encryption mechanism such as a stream ci-
pher) to modulate the parameters of, in general, a mul-
timode coherent state. Coherent states span an infinite
dimensional Hilbert space which we refer to as a qumode.
A qumode can be associated with any physical property
of light such as polarization, phase, frequency or time.
For the free-space implementation to be presented, the
qumodes are the two orthogonal modes of polarization.
In this case, Alice uses the running key K′ to specify
a polarization basis from a set of M uniformly spaced
two-mode bases spanning a great circle on the Poincare´
sphere. Each basis consists of a polarization state and
its antipodal state at an angle pi from it, representing
the 0 and 1 bit value for that basis. The message X is
encoded as YK′(X). This mapping of the stream of bits
onto points of the Poincare´ sphere is the key to be shared
by Alice and the receiver (Bob). Because of his knowl-
edge of K′, Bob is able to make a precise demodulation
operation producing the plaintext X. Bob applies K′ to
the received sequence of arbitrary polarization states to
return them to the linearly orthogonally polarized con-
dition, representing the two original bits of the message
X.
We present analysis that covers both polarization as
well as phase modulation of optical signals. In the case
of polarization states, information is encrypted and en-
coded on two orthogonal polarization modes of radiation
with annihilation operators a1 and a2. A coherent state
|ψ0〉 with amplitude α in mode a2 (|ψ0〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |α〉) is
“rotated” by a unitary transformation Uϕb (ϕb = 0 or pi)
to create the bit of a message. This rotation is performed
2by, e.g., Uϕb = exp[(ϕb/2)(a
†
1a2 − a1a†2)], giving
|ψb〉 = Uϕb |0〉 ⊗ |α〉 = |α sin
ϕb
2
〉 ⊗ |α cos ϕb
2
〉. (1)
For phase encoding within a given polarization state, one
could start by splitting a coherent state |α〉 into a two-
mode coherent state |Ψ0〉 = |α/
√
2〉1 ⊗ |α/
√
2〉2. Bit
encoding can be represented by the operation
|Ψb〉 = e−iJzϕb |Ψ0〉 = |e−iϕb/2α/
√
2〉1 ⊗ |eiϕb/2α/
√
2〉2,
(2)
where Jz = (a
†
1a1 − a†2a2)/2. Demonstration of the se-
curity of the ciphering scheme in both kinds of physical
encoding, polarization or phase, can be treated with the
same formalism and leads to the same result.
Let us analyze the phase ciphering, applied by the same
modulator generating the bit sequence. The ciphering
angle φν could have ν as a discrete or a continuous vari-
able determined by some general distribution. A ciphered
two-mode state is |Ψbν〉 = e−iJz(ϕb+φν)|Ψ0〉 and the cor-
responding density operator for all possible choices of ν
is ρb. The problem is to find the minimum probability of
error PEe that an eavesdropper (Eve) can achieve in bit
determination, given that ciphered states are used.
No restriction is imposed on the physical devices avail-
able to Eve, including perfect detectors and unlimited
computational power. A close-to-source attack is consid-
ered, where no losses have yet occurred that normally
would during propagation of the signal. These are the
ideal conditions for an eavesdropper.
The optimal POVM for discriminating between ρ0
and ρ1 is given by Helstrom’s binary discrimination
procedure[9] applied to ∆ρ = ρ1−ρ0. Calling Π1 and Π0
(Π1 + Π0 = I) the projectors over eigenstates with the
positive and negative eigenvalues of ∆ρ, the probability
of error PEe is
PEe = Tr [p1Π0ρ1 + p0Π1ρ0] , (3)
where p1 and p0 are a-priori probabilities to find a state
in ρ1 or ρ0, respectively. In one of Yuen’s scheme,[8]
closest values of a given k are associated with distinct
bits from the bit at position k. For example, φk =
pi
[
k/M + (1/2)
(
1− (−1)k)] , k = 0, 1, ...,M − 1. In this
encoding protocol, two closest neighboring states repre-
sent distinct bits. Figure 1 shows the minimum probabil-
ity of error as a function of the number of ciphering levels
M . PEe goes very fast to the asymptotic pure-guessing
limit of 1/2 as M increases. The quantum noise present
in the coherent state of light is what turns these states
indistinguishable to an eavesdropper.
Bob, on the other hand, by knowing the key has a
more complete information on the state of light sent and
can extract the information with great precision. His
probability of error is
PBe =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− e−2|α|2
)
. (4)
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FIG. 1: PEe as a function of M for |α|
2 = 1, 10, 100, 100.
For sufficiently large values of α the minimum probability
of error PBe is negligible, leading to an excellent signal
recovery by Bob.
Note that the present analysis does not include Eve’s
attacks using trial keys, which would be exponentially
complex. Also, the stream cipher output in the system is
not open to observation, thus its seed key is not open to
the usual known plaintext attacks. The complete security
analysis for the most general attacks would be presented
elsewhere.
This scheme opens up the path for long-distance secure
communication based on protection by physical laws in-
stead of mathematical complexities.
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